Originality/value: This is one of the first empirical efforts at investigating the association between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure in emerging MENA economies that observably relies on a multi-theoretical framework within a longitudinal crosscountry research setting.
Introduction
Prominent corporate scandals in the 1990s/2000s followed by the 2007/08 global financial crisis have increased global interest in pursuing good corporate governance (CG) reforms often aimed at enhancing greater corporate accountability, social responsibility, transparency, and disclosure Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016 Pillai et al., 2018) . This paper, therefore, examines the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in emerging MENA economies, and the extent to which corporate board characteristics and shareholding structures can explain discernible variations in the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The analysis and interpretations of the findings draw inspiration from a multi-theoretical framework that draw insights from a number of CG and disclosure theories.
Whilst the push for improvement in the level of CG, accountability, responsibility and transparency has mainly been concentrated in developed countries for decades, such as UK and US, recent years have also witnessed emerging economies showing an increasing interest in promoting the level of firm compliance with, and disclosure of, best CG practices through the adoption of CG codes (Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Soobaroyen et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) . MENA countries are also among a large group of emerging economies pursuing such CG reforms, which are primarily motivated by the ability of such CG codes to address systemic issues of corporate accountability, responsibility, and transparency (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Soobaroyen et al., 2017) . Implementation of such CG codes may also help reduce corporate financial risk and thereby improve corporate performance in these countries (Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Ebaid, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015) . In general, recent adoption of CG codes in emerging MENA economies tends to seek to complement other economic and financial reforms that they have often pursued and are aimed at encouraging domestic savings, as well as attracting foreign direct investments (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017; Hessayri and Saihi, 2018) .
Meanwhile, theoretically, publicly listed corporations and their managers in emerging economies may commit to comprehensive compliance with, and disclosure of, best CG best practices for a number of reasons. First, increased commitment to transparency and accountability through voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices can minimise agency problems (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) by reducing information asymmetry between managers and corporate stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) , which may enhance firm performance. Second, from legitimacy theory perspective (Aguilera et al., 2007; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) , engaging in greater transparency and disclosure practices through voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices can strategically enhance congruence of corporate goals and norms with those of society, which can facilitate sustainable corporate operations by improving corporate reputation and goodwill (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Md Zaini et al., 2018) . research setting (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Md Zaini et al., 2018) . Arguably, this impairs current understanding of the motivations for, and determinants of, corporate voluntary CG disclosures, especially in emerging economies. Therefore, the current study seeks to extend existing knowledge by offering a number of new contributions to the literature. First, we provide new evidence on the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, best CG practices among publicly listed MENA firms following the pursuance of CG reforms. Thus, the study contributes to the literature by offering evidence on the extent to which the existing MENA countries' national CG codes have helped in improving CG standards in listed corporations of these countries.
Second, we add to the existing literature by examining whether board characteristics and shareholding structures can explain observable changes in voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. This differs from a number of past studies that have mainly investigated how general company features, such as firm size, profitability, liquidity, and gearing affect voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Our argument is that in a competitive and informationally asymmetric market, whereby voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices have significant financial and non-financial cost implications, better-governed corporations need to distinguish themselves by credibly signalling their good governance, accountability and transparency qualities by committing to increased voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) . Arguably, this can help in improving current understanding of the main factors that drive the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices in emerging MENA economies in where various stakeholders, such as the national governments and stock exchanges often have keen interest in CG and stakeholder issues. Third, we use data collected over a relatively long and recent period (i.e., from 2009 to 2014) and thus allows us to distinctively shed crucial and timely empirical insights on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices over a relatively long period of time.
Finally and given the different motivations for voluntary CG compliance and disclosure (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) , the study is distinguished from previous studies by its explicit examination of a number of theoretical perspectives, including agency, legitimacy, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories, as providing the likely basis for understanding and explaining voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in the particular context of emerging MENA economies.
The decision to focus on MENA emerging economies is motivated by a number of reasons.
First, and consistent with global developments, MENA emerging economies have pursued CG reforms by issuing national CG codes [1] . Similar to most emerging economies, MENA CG codes adopts a UKstyle voluntary "comply or explain" compliance and disclosure regime (Piesse et al., 2012; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Pillai et al., 2018) . However and distinct from most developed countries, MENA context has distinctive cultural features of having strong hierarchical social structure, where greater importance is usually attached to informal relationships, such as family loyalty, norms, and tribalism than formal CG and accountability mechanisms like corporate boards (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Md Zaini et al., 2018) . The MENA corporate setting is further characterised by concentrated shareholding structures, especially by government and families, and low levels of institutional shareholdings, resulting in weak ability of shareholders to enforce managerial accountability, responsibility and control (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Md Zaini et al., 2018) . Arguably, these contextual challenges raise serious empirical questions as to whether voluntary compliance and disclosure CG codes that are prevalent in MENA economies can improve CG standards in their listed corporations (Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) .
This study, thus, seeks to contribute to the existing literature by investigating the motivations for, and determinants of, voluntary CG disclosures in MENA emerging economies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses the CG environment in MENA economies. The following sections present the theoretical framework, review the literature and develop hypotheses, discuss the research design, and present the empirical and robustness analyses, whilst the final section offers concluding remarks.
The governance environment in MENA emerging economies
MENA economies provide a suitable context to conduct the current study for a number of reasons. First, most MENA economies have many cultural, social and economic features in common, along with other characteristics of developing countries. Specifically, the people speak Arabic as a common language , follow a common Islamic religion, and share many customs and traditions, which may arguably have an effect on economic features, business practices, shareholding structures, and the information environment, especially voluntary disclosure environment (Al-Shamri and Al-Sultan, 2010; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Habbash et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Md Zaini et al., 2018; Pillai et al., 2018) . In this regard, MENA countries' corporate practices are expected to be affected by both formal and informal rules (Moideenkutty et al., 2011; Elghuweel et al., 2017) .
Specifically, managers can be expected to be influenced more by informal rules (e.g., family, norms, Arabic customs and tribalism) and thus they are likely to give such informal rules higher priority than formal rules and governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; AlJanadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Pillai et al., 2018) . However, commitment to such traditional norms may arguably have a negative effect on MENA directors' ability to independently monitor managers and ultimately enhance voluntary disclosure of CG practices.
Second, most companies in MENA countries are either state owned or family held firms with concentrated shareholding structures. As such, they differ from companies in developed countries, which by contrast, tend to depend extensively on external finance from stock markets (Omran et al., 2008; Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017) . Third, the legal system and corporate laws tend to provide limited protection to minority shareholders compared with those operating in developed economies (Omran et al., 2008) . Additionally, accounting standards are often developed and implemented by central government, with little involvement of national professional accounting bodies, which are often poorly organised and/or even non-existent (Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan 2010; Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 2010; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015) .
Fourth, the financial systems in most MENA countries are bank-orientated (Ebaid, 2013) , and therefore capital markets are not vibrant, and enforcement of capital markets rules are weak (Elghuweel et al., 2017) . This helps in explaining why most listed companies in these economies do not often adhere to the disclosure and transparency requirements that have been imposed by stock market authorities (Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Md Zaini et al., 2018) . Consequently, minority shareholders' rights are limited because of the inefficiency in the information environment that encourages insiders and majority shareholders to gain from private information (Dimitropoulos and Asterious, 2010; Piesse et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017) .
Despite differences among MENA countries, almost all need to develop their investment environment, especially their stock markets and related governance mechanisms. Sound governance practices can help firms to gain access to finance, lower the cost of capital, achieve better performance, and provide fairer treatment of all stockholders (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014) .
Similarly, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries depend extensively on extracting and exporting oil and have recently discovered the need for diversifying their finance and investment by developing their financial markets, especially given the volatility of oil prices of the early 1980s, late 1990s, and more recently in the 2010s (Piesse et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Pillai et al., 2018) . For other MENA countries, active capital markets are considered essential for the pursuance of successful economic and financial reforms, which began in the early 1990s. These reforms depend on large-scale privatisation programmes involving the divestiture of large public sector companies (Piesse et al., 2012; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017) . Consequently, most MENA countries have thus engaged in economic and financial reforms (such as developing national stock exchanges, issuing national governance codes, and improving business-related laws and regulations) with the aim of encouraging domestic savings and attracting foreign investments (Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan 2010; Ebaid, 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Elkelish, 2017; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Hessayri and Saihi, 2018) . Indeed, the empirical evidence supports the role of good governance practices in enhancing market efficiency and the information environment of the MENA countries (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Al-Basaam et al., 2018) .
However, other empirical evidence documents that their incentives for frequent disclosure and transparency are lower than their counterparts in developed countries (Alsaeed, 2006; Al-Shammair and Al-Sultan, 2010; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Md Zaini et al., 2018) , due to the absence of standards set out by authoritative accounting and reporting bodies that can mandate public firms to improve their disclosure practices (Alsaeed, 2006; Aljifri, et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Md Zaini et al., 2018) . Thus, the current study seeks to examine the extent to which MENA corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose their good governance practice recommendations contained in their CG codes.
Governance and voluntary disclosure: Literature review and hypotheses development
A large number of scholars have investigated the motives and antecedents of voluntary disclosure of good CG practices (e.g., Cooke, 2002, 2005; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) . The current study seeks to extend that voluntary disclosure literature. In particular, it draws on agency, legitimacy, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories to investigate the association between board characteristics, shareholding structures, and the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in MENA listed firms.
Board diversity and voluntary disclosure
Corporate boards are required to fulfil certain roles, including advising managers, monitoring executives and securing resources (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . Board diversity can enhance board effectiveness by improving their ability to fulfil their assigned roles. From the agency theory perspective, recruiting directors with a broader range of attributes can enhance board efficiency by increasing board independence, improving managerial monitoring and performance, and bringing diverse ideas and opinions to board discussions Anifowose et al., 2017) .
Additionally, more heterogonous boards can have access to external organisations through different channels of communication provided by the different directors (resource dependence theory). Likewise, diversified boards can enhance network ties that may provide access to resources, such as finance from external organisations (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) . Similarly, and from the stakeholder and legitimation theoretical perspectives, more diverse boards provide better links between the company and its external environment and influential stakeholders (stakeholder theory) (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) , by enhancing company legitimacy and the board's trustworthiness (legitimacy theory) (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Anifowose et al., 2017) .
A large number of empirical studies have supported the positive impact of diverse boards on voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Cook, 2002, 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) , although there are few of such studies with regard to MENA countries. In Jordan, Ibrahim and Hanefah (2014) document that board diversity (independence, gender, age, and nationality) has a positive impact on the level of CSR disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1. There is a positive association between board diversity on the basis of gender and ethnic minority and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.
Board leadership structure and voluntary disclosure
The board chairperson is responsible for running board meetings, in addition to supervising, hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993) . Thus, agency theory suggests that concentrating the board leadership structure in one person (i.e., where the CEO also serves simultaneously as the chairperson) reduces the effectiveness of the board's monitoring regarding potential domination of the board. This is because the manager who initiates and implements important decisions (as CEO) also has to control and monitor these decisions (as chairperson), and therefore may take decisions that benefit him/her at the expense of shareholders' interests (Barako et al., 2006; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Pillai et al., 2018) . Thus, separating the two roles can improve the quality of monitoring (Hassoun and Aloui, 2017) , and thereby improving corporate transparency (Haniff and Cook, 2002; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) . Similarly, legitimacy theory suggests that separation of the two roles can improve checks and balances over management performance. If a CEO controls board meetings, determines agenda items, and selects board members, this can exacerbate the level of agency problems between management and owners (Haniff and Cook, 2002, 2005) , which may have a negative impact on the legitimacy of managerial decisions.
Despite the conflicting results reported in the literature, the majority of empirical evidence has supported the negative impact of CEO role duality on the extent of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Haniff and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 2012) . Other studies have found no significant association between the two variables (e.g., Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Al-Shemary and Al-Soultan, 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Alnabsha et al., 2018) . On the other hand, Al-Janadi et al., (2016), using 87 companies from the Saudi stock market, find that the separation of CEO and chairperson positions has a negative significant impact on voluntary CG disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, our second nondirectional hypothesis is as follows:
H2. There is an association between combining the board leadership position and CEO and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.
Family shareholdings and voluntary disclosure
Firms that are controlled by founding families tend to experience lower agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and management (Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Chau and Gray, 2010) . Family owners are more likely to keep their shareholdings on a long-term basis (Anderson et al., 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) , have better access to information, and exercise closer monitoring of management, leading to lower demand for corporate voluntary disclosure (Chen et al., 2008 , Ali et al., 2007 Chau and Gray, 2010) . Ali et al. (2007) argue that family shareholders prefer to provide low levels of disclosures relating to their CG practices in order to facilitate employing family members on board without much interference from non-family shareholders.
Employing 4,415 observations from US listed firms in the period 1996-2000, Chen et al. (2008) find that family firms disclose lower voluntary information compared to non-family firms.
Likewise, Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms provides lower disclosure about their CG practices compared to their non-family counterparts. By contrast, Chau and Gray (2010) report positive effect of higher family shareholding (more than 25%) on voluntary disclosure. Thus, based on these arguments, our third non-directional hypothesis is as follows:
H3. There is an association between family shareholdings and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.
Director shareholdings and voluntary disclosure
Director shareholdings probably influence decisions regarding voluntary CG disclosure practices (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) . From an agency theory perspective, higher director shareholdings can mitigate agency conflicts between directors and shareholders by aligning their interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi, 2014; Khlif et al., 2017; Pillai et al., 2018) . Consequently, corporate boards need not strive hard in order to enhance voluntary CG disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012; Alnabsha et al., 2018) .
Furthermore, and from the legitimisation perspective, firms with lower director shareholdings tend to invest more in CG practices and voluntary CG disclosure in order to enhance company legitimacy and stakeholder confidence in the board (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) . Empirically, existing evidence has indicated a negative association between director shareholdings and voluntary disclosure of CG practices (e.g., Hussain and Al-Najjar, 2012; Albitar, 2015; Khlif et al., 2017) . However, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) , Samaha et al. (2012) and Alnabsha et al., (2018) report an insignificant impact. Thus, based on these arguments, our fourth hypothesis is as follows:
H4. There is a negative association between director shareholdings and the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure.
Government shareholdings and voluntary disclosure
Corporations with high government shareholdings seek to gain government support by engaging in good CG practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) . This is because winning the support of government cannot only help in legitimatising corporate operations (legitimacy theory) (Aguilera et al., 2007) , but also aid in gaining essential resources, such as subsidies, tax exemptions and contracts that can improve company performance (resource dependence theory) (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . However, a number of studies argue that higher levels of state shareholdings, with wide and powerful political connections, provide protection against review and discipline by regulatory authorities (e.g., Jia et al., 2009; Hou and Moore, 2010; Khlif et al., 2017; Alnabsha et al., 2018) . Al-Janadi et al., (2016) report that government shareholdings have a moderating negative effect on the association between CG factors (board size and non-executive directors (NEDs)) and voluntary disclosure. This indicates that government shareholdings can have a negative effect on the effectiveness of CG structures in a firm.
Consequently, firms with high government shareholdings are less likely to voluntarily disclose CG practices.
Empirically, there is a lack of studies examining the association between government shareholdings and the extent of voluntary disclosure in emerging markets in general and MENA countries in particular. Eng and Mak (2003) , Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) , Kolsi (2017) 
Data and research methodology 4.1 Data: sample selection, sources, and description
Our sample is based on 494 non-financial and non-utility corporations listed on the national stock exchanges of five MENA countries namely, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab of Emirates at the end of 2014. We exclude financials and utilities because they are subject to different regulations and have different capital structures, which may affect their disclosure and CG practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) . We collected data relating to CG attributes and CG disclosure by hand from the annual financial reports over the period 2009 to 2014. Because traditional manual content analysis consumes a considerable amount of time and effort, and in line with similar past disclosure studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Donnelly and Malcahy, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2017; Anifowose et al., 2017) , we collected data on 600 firm year observations from 100 corporations employing the widely used stratified sampling technique based on firm size and industry in each country, as illustrated in Table 1 . Noticeably, our sample is much larger than most past accounting and disclosure studies that have been conducted in emerging economies that have employed similar stratified sampling techniques (Barako et al., 2006; Ahmed et al., 2017; Anifowose et al., 2017) . Thus, our sampling approach and data arguably constitute a discernible improvement on existing studies, including being distinctively: (i) cross-country; and (ii) longitudinal in nature. Data on board characteristics and shareholding structures were manually collected from firms' annual reports and websites of sampled countries' capital markets. Financial and accounting variables were collected from DataStream database.
Insert Table 1 about here
Research methodology: definition of variables and model specification
We group our variables into three, namely: (i) dependent; (ii) independent; and (iii) control variables, which are also reported in Appendix 1 and Table 2 with detailed information regarding how each variable was operationalised. First, our main dependent variable is the CG index (GINDEX). This index follows a checklist developed by the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), organised by the United Nations Conference Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2006) . This checklist ("UNCTAD ISAR benchmark") of guidance on good practice in CG disclosure was based on five sections used to construct 5 sub-indices: (i) ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH); (ii) financial transparency (TCY); (iii) auditing (AUD); (iv) corporate responsibility and compliance (RTY); and (v) board and management structure and process (BMS). The GINDEX is constructed by awarding a value of '1' if each of the 51 CG provisions is disclosed and '0' otherwise. With this binary scoring scheme, a firm's total disclosure score in a particular firm year can vary between 0 (perfect non-compliance and non-disclosure) and 100% (perfect compliance and disclosure).
Insert Table 2 about here Independent variables are: (i) board characteristics, including, gender and ethnicity diversity within the board of directors (DIV) and unitary of board leadership (UBL), and (ii) shareholding structures including, family shareholdings (FSH), director shareholdings (DSH) and government shareholdings (GSH). We include a number of control variables that may have an impact on voluntary CG disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Hanifa and Cooke, 2002; Donnelly and Malcahy, 2008; Albitar, 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Kolsi, 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) . These control variables include board size (BRDS), audit firm size (AFSIZ), firm size (LNTA), firm age (AGE), growth opportunity (GRTH), leverage (LV), profitability (PROFIT), dummy variables for the year of operation (DYER), dummy variables for industry (DIND), and dummy variables for countries (DCOU).
The following OLS regression model is used assuming that all relations are linear:
Where GINDEX refers to overall MENA countries' CG disclosure index. DIV refers to board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity. UBL refers to unitary of board leadership. FSH refers to family shareholdings, DSH refers to director shareholdings. GSH refers to government shareholdings. CONTROLS refers to firm-level control variables, namely, board size (BRDS), audit firm size (AFSIZ), firm size (LNTA), firm age (AGE), growth opportunity (GRTH), leverage (LV), profitability (PROFIT), year dummies (DYER), industry dummies (DIND), and country dummies (DCOU). Table 3 contains summary descriptive analysis of the main dependent, independent and control variables over the 6 years investigated (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the overall (GINDEX) index and its sub-indices. GINDEX shows wide variation, ranging from a minimum of 31.37% (16 out of 51) to a maximum of 84.31% (43 out of 51), with the average (median) firm complying with 56.45 % (56.86%) of the 51 CG provisions examined. With regard to the GINDEX's 5 sub-indices, they also show substantial differences in their descriptive analysis. For example, ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH) ranges from a minimum compliance rate of 22.22% to a maximum of 100%, with the average firm complying with 63.31% of the 9 CG provisions investigated. Also, board and management structure and process (BMS) ranges from a minimum compliance rate of 22.22% to a maximum of 88.89%, with the average firm complying with 58.09% of the 18 CG provisions investigated. Thus, the descriptive statistics indicate considerable variations in the level of compliance and disclosure for both the overall GINDEX and its 5 sub-indices, which are consistent with the evidence of past CG disclosure studies in MENA countries (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015 , Al-Janadi et al., 2016 Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) . Accordingly, despite the existing CG codes, MENA listed firms generally show a lower extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, the overall GINDEX and its 5 sub-indices along with significant disparities at this level compared to developing countries [2] . These findings support the view that implementation and enforcement of corporate regulations, such as best CG practices are weak, and thereby leading to low levels of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations in MENA countries (Piesse et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Albitar, 2015; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017; Md Zaini et al., 2018) Insert Table 3 about here The descriptive statistics for independent and control variables are reported in Panels D and E of Table 3 , respectively. Starting with independent variables, board diversity (DIV) on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority ranges from 0% to 69.23% with an average of 7.88%, which suggests that on average MENA listed firms' boards are dominated by Arab men. Board diversity on the basis of gender (DIVG) and ethnic minority (DIVE) ranges from 0% to 37.50% and 66.67%, respectively, with averages of 2.71% and 5.20%. Limited sampled firms have unitary board leadership structure (UBL) with an average of 21%. Shareholding structure mechanisms show variation, where family shareholdings (FSH), director shareholdings (DSH), and government shareholdings (GSH) range from a minimum of 1.08%, 0% and 0% to a maximum of 100%, 98.92% and 98.67% with an average of 49.85%, 44.94% and 16.15%, respectively. Board and shareholding statistics are consistent with the findings of previous studies conducted in MENA countries (e.g., Samaha et al., 2012; Elghuweel et al., 2017 : Al-Bassam et al., 2018 .
Empirical results and discussions

Empirical results: descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis
To provide further informative inferences from our analysis, we divided the total sampled firmyears into two sub-groups: (i) firms with high GINDEX scores (i.e., firms with a GINDEX scores above the overall mean/median value); and (ii) firms with low GINDEX scores (i.e., firms with a GINDEX score below the overall mean/median value). Columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 report the findings of the ttest, comparing mean and median differences for our independent and control variables. Generally, the findings reported show that the two sub-groups have significant differences in the means and medians between both of them. For instance, the mean is significantly different between the two sub-samples as follows: board gender and ethnicity diversity (3.66); board gender diversity (-1.45); board ethnicity diversity (5.15); unitary board leadership structure (-40.00); family shareholdings (4.61); and government shareholdings (6.69). Our findings suggest that firms with more diverse boards and with high family and government shareholdings are more likely to engage in greater compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices. On the other hand, firms with greater gender diverse boards, and have unitary board leadership structure are more likely to engage in low compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices.
The OLS regression technique is used to test all the current studies hypotheses, and thus a number of OLS regression diagnostics assumptions were examined, including multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. Table 4 presents the correlation matrix (including both Pearson's parametric and Spearman's non-parametric coefficients) for the variables to test for multicollinearity. The direction and magnitude of both coefficients are generally similar, hence suggesting that any remaining non-normalities may not pose a serious statistical problem. Noticeably, the bivariate correlations among the variables are also averagely low, indicating that any remaining multicollinearity problems may not be statistically harmful. In addition, the authors investigated (for brevity not presented here, but available on request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, histograms, skewness and kurtosis, VIF, tolerance statistics, Breusch-Pagan test, Cook's distance, leverage values, and Durbin-Watson statistic. The results from these tests suggesting no serious violation of the OLS assumptions, except that some of the continuous variables (DIV, DIVG, DIVE, GRTH) are not normally distributed, thus and in line with previous studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Samaha et al., 2012) , these variables were transferred into ranks based on normal scores before running the OLS regression analysis [3] .
Interestingly and as expected, Table 5 indicates that board diversity based on ethnicity (DIVE), government shareholdings (GSH), audit firm size (AFSIZ), firm size (LNTA), growth opportunity (GRTH), leverage (LV), and profitability (PROFIT) have a statistically significant positive relationship with the GINDEX. On the other hand, the correlation matrix shows that GINDEX has a negative significant correlation with board diversity based on gender (DIVG), unitary board leadership (UBL), director shareholdings (DSH), and firm age (AGE).
Insert Table 4 about here
Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis
Models 1 to 4 of Table 5 reports the findings of the cross-sectional pooled OLS regressions for the model examining the effect of board characteristics and shareholding structures on the extent of disclosure and compliance with CG practices. The results contained in Model 4, which is the study's main model, generally indicate that the independent variables (board characteristics and shareholding structures) are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in the voluntary CG disclosures.
Insert Table 5 about here The results in Model 4 of Table 5 suggest that DIV is significantly and positively related to the GINDEX, which offers empirical support for H1. Theoretically, the result is largely in line with the predictions of our multi-theoretical framework that draws insights from agency, resource dependence, legitimacy, and stakeholder theories, which suggest a positive effect of board diversity on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Empirically, the findings are consistent with the literature (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) . However, Model 3 in Table 5 shows that board diversity based on gender (DIVG) is positively, but insignificantly associated with GINDEX, while boards with members from diverse ethnic minorities (DIVE) are positively and significantly associated with the extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.
Unitary board leadership (UBL) has a negative and significant association with GINDEX, which supports H2. Theoretically, this finding is consistent with agency theory that suggests that boards with separate roles of chairperson and CEO are more likely to voluntarily comply and disclose CG practices.
Also it enhances the legitimacy of managerial decisions by developing checks and balances over management's performance and reducing advantages gained from withholding information (legitimacy theory). Empirically, the results support previous studies which have documented a positive and significant association between separate CEO/chairperson roles and the extent of voluntary disclosure of CG practices (e.g., Haniff and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 2012) . Economically, the implications of this findings can be quantified as, a one standard deviation change in DIV and UBL may be associated with about 1.43% (14.34% × 0.100) and .65% (40.90% × 0.016) change in the level of the GINDEX, respectively.
The results in Model 4 of Table 5 suggest that FSH is statistically insignificant related to the GINDEX, implying that family shareholdings of MENA listed firms have no significant impact on the level of CG practices. This finding does not offer empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that family shareholdings provide closer managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry that is usually minimise agency problems, and hence a lesser need for increased CG disclosures (Chen et al., 2008 , Ali et al., 2007 Chau and Gray, 2010) . We interpret this as indicating that family investors may have more efficient and timely channels for extracting value relevant information. Thus, family shareholdings are not related to our disclosure index, which captures more formal disclosures in the annual report. Empirically, our finding is inconsistent with previous studies that have reported significant association between family shareholdings and voluntary CG disclosure (Chen et al., 2008; Ali et al., 2007; Chau and Gray, 2010) .
With respect to DSH, the findings in Model 4 of Table 5 suggests that DSH is statistically significant and negatively related to the GINDEX, implying that MENA listed firms with more director shareholdings provide less voluntary disclosure of CG practices. This finding offers empirical support for our multi-theoretical framework, which argues that firms with lower director shareholdings tend to invest more in CG practices to enhance company's legitimacy and stakeholder confidence in the board (Eng and Mak, 2003; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) . This also supports H6 and the findings of past studies, which suggest that DSH affects negatively on voluntary CG disclosure (Hussain and Al-Najjar, 2012; Albitar, 2015; Khlif et al., 2017) .
Furthermore, the findings in Model 4 of Table 5 also suggest that GSH is statistically significant and negatively related to the GINDEX, therefore H5 is empirically supported. Although, some theoretical evidence suggests that firms with high government shareholding are more likely to voluntarily disclose good CG practices to facilitate gaining essential resources (resource dependence theory) (Haniffa and Huddaib, 2006) , to mitigate agency conflict between management and owners (agency theory) (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Khlif et al., 2017) , and to legitimise its operations (legitimacy theory) (Alguilera et al., 2007) . Empirically, the negative association between government shareholdings and GINDEX is congruent with the finding of Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016) and AlJanadi et al., (2016) suggesting that governments in MENA countries with significant shareholdings have no interest in providing sufficient information to mitigate agency conflict, and that the objective of the state when it has a controlling stake in companies is to attain political and social objectives, rather than shareholder value maximization (Piesse et al., 2011) . The economic relevance of these findings are that a one standard deviation change (increase) in DSH and GSH may be associated with about 1.14% (27.90% × 0.041) and 1.03% (24.60% × 0.042) change (decrease) in the level of the GINDEX, respectively.
The main CG index used in this study (GINDEX) contains five sub-indices. To infer the association between board characteristics and shareholding structures with the five sub-indices and assess whether these relations differ from the overall GINDEX, Table 6 shows the results of the OLS regression of the explanatory and control variables on the five sub-indices. For example, the coefficients of DIV (except for OSH and BMS) remain significant and positively associated with the five sub-indices.
Similarly, the coefficients of DSH (except for TCY and BMS), GSH (except for TCY) are negatively and significantly associated with the five sub-indices, while the coefficients of FSH remains insignificant ly associated with all the five sub-indices. Generally, the findings presented in Table 6 empirically support the former results illustrated in Table 5 . The observed sensitivities in the coefficients implying that MENA corporations differ in terms of the importance that they attach to the various categories of the CG best practices. Finally, the coefficients of the control variables in Table 5 are generally consistent with expectations. For example, the coefficients of AFSIZ, LNTA, and PROFIT are positively associated with the GINDEX, whereas the coefficient of AGE is negatively related to the GINDEX.
Robustness tests
The study carries out further analyses to examine the robustness of our findings. First, and as previously explained, all the 51 provisions constituting the GINDEX are equally weighted, but the number of provisions varies across the five sub-indices, resulting in different weights being assigned to each subindex: OSH, 17.6%; TCY, 15.7%; auditing, 17.6%; RTY, 13.7%; and BMS, 35.3%. Accordingly, an alternative index (W-GINDEX) is created in which each of the five sub-indices is assigned an equal weight of 20% to find out whether the results hold regardless of the weighting of the five sub-indices.
Model 1 of Table 7 shows that our results are largely consistent with those obtained using the nonweighted CG index (GINDEX) presented in Model 4 of Table 5 .
Second, to investigate the existence of a non-linear association between (FSH), (DSH), and (GSH), and voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices, Model 4 in Table 5 GINDEX, suggesting that family shareholdings become more entrenched at higher levels of ownership, which is consistent with theoretical suggestions that high family ownership increases the information asymmetry problem between controlling and minority shareholders, therefore firms may increase the extent of corporate disclosure to reduce agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders (Chau and Gray, 2010; Hassoun and Aloui, 2017) .
Third, to address potential endogeneity problems that may arise from a simultaneous relationship between the board/shareholding mechanisms and the CG disclosures, a lagged structure was estimated by introducing a one year gap between the CG disclosures and board characteristics and ownership mechanisms. The results reported in Model 3 of Table 7 is largely similar to those contained in Model 4 of Table 5, suggesting that the study's findings are generally robust to possible endogeneity problems that may result from the simultaneous link between board characteristics, shareholding mechanisms, and the GINDEX. Fourth, and in order to address potential endogeneities that might arise as a result of omitted variables, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model was estimated. First, the probability of an existence of an endogenous relationship between board characteristics and shareholding structure mechanisms on the one hand, and GINDEX on the other hand, was examined by a Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (following Beiner et al., 2006) . The results reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Consequently, estimating a 2SLS test using a CG mechanisms instrument that will be more correlated with CG mechanisms, but less with the regression structural errors, will seem more appropriate than the OLS model. The findings reported in Model 4 of Fourth, we know that CG disclosure may be affected by other firm-specific opportunities and difficulties that corporations encounter and tend to vary over time (Henry, 2008) . Therefore, a fixedeffect model was estimated to address potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities that the OLS regression model may fail to control (Henry, 2008; Elmagrhi et al., 2016) . The estimated fixed-effect model is based on the re-estimation of Model 4 in Table 6 , by including 99 dummies to represent the 100 sampled firms. The findings illustrated in Model 5 of Table 7 imply that the study's findings are robust to potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.
Finally, a considerable number of evidence suggests that firm size can influence the extent to which firms disclose their CG practices (Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al. 2016; Habbash et al., 2016) . Therefore and to ascertain the possible impact of firm size on the voluntary disclosure-CG relationship, we split the sample into two sub-samples using high (i.e., above the median score) and low (i.e., below the sample median score) median scores. In general, the findings presented in Models 6 and 7 of Table 7 indicate that larger firms are more likely to have sufficient resources to bear the cost of complying with CG rules compared with their smaller counterparts (Samaha et al., 2012; Habbash et al., 2016) . To sum up, the evidence resulting from the study's additional analyses suggest that the study's findings appear not to be sensitive to different endogenous relationships.
Summary and conclusion
Although recent decades have witnessed increasing interest in the study of international corporate governance, the literature examining MENA countries level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices is still limited. Consequently, this study investigates the extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices among firms listed in MENA countries. Specifically, it examines whether board characteristics and shareholding structures can explain cross-sectional variations in the extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices in MENA countries using a multitheoretical framework. Hence and employing a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, legitimacy, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of board characteristics (i.e., gender and ethnic diversity within the board of directors and unitary of board leadership) and shareholding structures (i.e., family shareholdings, director shareholdings, and government shareholdings) on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices in firms listed in MENA countries. The findings from this study suggest that board characteristics and shareholding structures are generally significant in explaining differences in the voluntary CG disclosures.
Specifically, the study's results suggest that corporations with diversified boards based on gender and ethnicity disclose considerably more than those that are not. By contrast, our findings suggest that unitary board leadership and an increase in director and government shareholdings significantly reduce the amount of voluntary CG disclosures. In contrast, the role of family investors as active monitors of managers is statistically negligible.
The study's findings have important implications for regulators, policy-makers, managers, and corporations not only in MENA countries, but also in other developing countries and emerging markets intending to pursue CG reforms. For example, the high degree of heterogeneity among MENA listed firms in terms of the levels of CG compliance supports the argument that most listed companies in these countries do not adhere to disclosure and transparency requirements, given the lack of legislative enforcement. Therefore, this suggests that there is a need for the regulatory authorities and policymakers to further enhance CG compliance and enforcement. This can be achieved by strengthening legislative enforcement and establishing a "compliance and enforcement" unit that will continuously observe the implementation of CG practices. Likewise, as the presence of low director shareholdings,
and low government shareholdings are demonstrated to have a positive effect on good CG practices, it provides the national stock exchanges the impetus to implement measures that will encourage reductions in the level of director and government shareholdings of MENA listed corporations. Also, for managers and corporations, our evidence suggests that they can improve their CG standards by diversifying their boards and separating CEO and board chairperson positions with the view of enhancing the process of monitoring firms' compliance with best CG practices.
Finally, although the findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models, there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged. This study depends on a relatively limited sample size (i.e., 600 firm-year observations collected from five MENA economies) because the data was collected manually, which was labour intensive. Thus, future studies could employ a much larger sample that may help enhance generalisability of their findings. Similarly, the study investigated the impact of a relatively limited set of firm-level internal CG mechanisms (i.e., board characteristics and shareholding structures) on CG disclosure. Future studies might examine the impact of other sets of internal CG mechanisms (e.g., board of directors' efficiency and frequency of meetings, and existence and characteristics of the audit committee), along with other external CG characteristics (e.g., government regulations, media exposure, market competition, and takeover activities), and county-level cultural factors (e.g., national governance quality, cultural and religious practices, and social norms) on voluntary CG disclosure. Finally, annual reports can sometimes carry mixed messages. Therefore, future studies may improve on the study's evidence by employing qualitative approaches, such as conducting in-depth face-to-face interviews with relevant stakeholders, such as auditors, company directors, and investors. This may provide a better understanding of the different determinants of voluntary CG disclosures. Sub-index of GINDEX related to ownership structure and exercise of control rights consisting of 9 provisions that take a value of 1 if each of the 9 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%. TCY Sub-index of GINDEX related to financial transparency consisting of 8 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 8 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%. AUD Sub-index of GINDEX related to auditing consisting of 9 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 9 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%. RTY Sub-index of GINDEX related to corporate responsibility and compliance consisting of 7 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 7 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%. BM S Sub-index of GINDEX related to board and management structure and process consisting of 18 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 18 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%. Note s: GINDEX, MENA countries' CG disclosure index; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; DIVG, board diversity on the basis of gender; DIVE, board diversity on the basis of ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; DSH, director shareholdings; GSH, government shareholdings; BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNT A, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRT H, growth opportunity; LV, leverage; PROFIT, profitability; DYER, year dummies; DIND, industry dummies; and DCOU, country dummies. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. Note s: OSH, ownership structure and exercise of control rights; TCY, financial transparency; AUD, auditing; RT Y, corporate responsibility and compliance; BMS, board and management structure and process; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; DSH, director shareholdings; GSH, government shareholdings; BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNT A, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRT H, growth opportunity; LV, leverage; PROFIT, profitability; DYER, year dummies; DIND, industry dummies; and DCOU, country dummies. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. Note s: GINDEX, MENA countries' CG disclosure index; DIV, board diversity on the basis of both gender and ethnicity; UBL, unitary of board leadership; FSH, family shareholdings; FSH 2 , family shareholdings squared; DSH, director shareholdings; DSH 2 , director shareholdings squared; GSH, government shareholdings; GSH 2 , government shareholdings squared; BRDS, board size; AFSIZ, audit firm size; LNT A, firm size; AGE, firm age; GRT H, growth opportunity; LV, leverage; PROFIT , profitability; DYER, year dummies; DIND, industry dummies; and DCOU, country dummies. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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